Challenges and Opportunities
by Ilan Stein
Abstract: The EU’s energy and foreign policy vis-à-vis Algeria is ambitious, seeking as it does to achieve three primary objectives—democratization, economic liberalization, and security of energy supplies. Whether the EU will succeed in these objectives is far from certain. This paper analyzes the historical record in an attempt to discern the likelihood that the EU will indeed achieve its objectives. In doing so, it assesses EU policy towards Algeria since 1995, identifies the main challenges and opportunities facing EU policymakers in Algeria, and proposes a new policy approach for EU leaders to consider in pursuing more secure energy supplies and internal political and economic reform in Algeria.
In July 2007, Sonatrach, Algeria’s state-owned gas and oil company, agreed to drop destination clauses, legal instruments to prevent the resale of goods, from its gas contracts with EU member states. This measure, which will enable European countries to reexport Algerian gas, bolsters the European Commission’s effort to create a single Europe-wide gas market. However, whether it will help the EU to achieve its wider policy objectives in Algeria—democratization, liberalization and security of gas supplies—is far from certain. While some scholars argue that Sonatrach’s recent concession signals an increased willingness amongst Algerian decision makers to cooperate with the EU, I contend that the historical record belies such optimism. Indeed, a critical reading of EU-Algerian relations since 1995 illustrates two important points: first, that Algeria has cooperated with the EU not as an end in itself but rather as a means to avert economic and political crises; and second, that reforms in Algeria are short-lived even when they have the government’s backing due to the power that domestic interest groups wield over Algeria’s political process.
In the following paper, I briefly review EU energy and foreign policy initiatives vis-à-vis Algeria since 1995, highlighting the flaws in each. I then analyze Algeria’s lukewarm response to these initiatives. Finally, I argue that the EU should reformulate its policy approach towards Algeria. Given Algeria’s recent economic stability, its diminished dependence on gas exports to Europe, and the continued influence of Algerian interest groups, it is unlikely that further reform will follow on the heels of Sonatrach’s recent concession. Thus, rather than continuing to call for unpopular liberal reforms, which in the long run could lead Algeria to redirect its gas exports to non-European countries, EU leaders ought to focus on trying to secure gas supplies from Algeria, replacing its normative political concerns with practical policy considerations.
EU Policy Initiatives Since 1995
Since 1995, the EU has adopted three major initiatives concerning its relationship with Algeria, each of which built upon the previous one. The first, the Barcelona Process, outlined in generalized terms the EU’s vision for an EU-Mediterranean alliance. The Barcelona Declaration called upon the Eastern Mediterranean and North African countries to pursue horizontal integration, which included economic liberalization, tariff reduction, and accession to what the EU hoped would become a Mediterranean free trade area by 2010. The EU also outlined its vision for greater social and cultural progress in the Mediterranean Partner countries. It called on them to democratize, eradicate corruption, bolster human rights, and promote cultural exchange with European and neighboring countries. Finally, the EU articulated its vision of vertical integration between the EU and Mediterranean Partner countries, realized through the execution of bilateral and multilateral agreements between the EU and the Mediterranean Partners. The attainment of these goals, the EU hoped, would establish the foundation upon which further collaboration in economic and political projects could be realized, which would in turn improve the prospects for creating a robust, lasting Mediterranean alliance.
From the start, fundamental flaws in the design of the Barcelona Declaration, including “relative complexity, limited visibility and popular legitimacy,”1 undermined its efficacy. It unrealistically tried to forge closer ties between countries that were at war (i.e., Israel and Lebanon), as well as countries whose relations had in recent years been severely strained (i.e., Algeria and Morocco). It also strove to create a free trade area in a region characterized by economic asymmetries between countries, including differences in growth strategies, monetary and fiscal policies and dependence on hydrocarbon exports. By 2002, few of the called-for reforms had been implemented in North Africa. The process of economic liberalization, while relatively successful in the eastern Mediterranean, quickly stagnated in North Africa. As Mustafa Nabli of the World Bank asserted, “financial sectors [in North Africa] remain weak…trade liberalization remains incomplete…public ownership remains high…and the regulatory framework and supportive institutions for growth have not materialized.”2 Meanwhile, democratization largely failed; North African countries remained some of the most corrupt in the world,3 and in Algeria particularly, political violence spread, leading the government to issue emergency decrees and curb civil liberties.
In light of the failure of the Barcelona Process, EU leaders launched a second initiative in 2004 known as the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which it hoped would improve upon the Barcelona Process. In the ENP Strategy Paper, published in May 2004, the European Commission articulated with greater precision and propounded with greater force the EU’s foreign policy objectives in the Mediterranean. “The privileged relationship with neighbours,” it asserted, “will build on mutual commitment to common values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development.” While it acknowledged that “the full potential of [existing] agreements [had] not yet been realized,” the ENP argued that a renewed effort to foster cooperation would likely result in real progress, helping the EU and its Mediterranean Partners to realize their respective objectives—for the EU, to encourage liberal reform and increase market access for European firms; for Mediterranean Partners, to achieve economic growth and end political violence.4 Meanwhile, in the ENP Strategy Paper for Algeria, the EC explicitly stated its intent to encourage investment and reform in Algeria’s energy sector. “The development of a strategic partnership between the EU and Algeria in the energy sector,” it asserted, “is a priority.”5
Finally, in 2007, EU officials and European heads of state produced a new Energy Strategy, one that strengthened the EC’s mandate to regulate European energy industries and bolstered its ability to pursue negotiations with oil- and gas-producing countries in the Mediterranean. In this document, the EU highlighted the risks of being overly dependent on oil and gas when, “several EU Member States are essentially dependent on one single gas supplier” and, “the mechanisms to ensure solidarity between Member States in the event of a crisis are not yet in place.”6 It laid out two broad strategies to achieve greater energy security in a time of heightened insecurity – import diversification and internal market liberalization through the unbundling of large national utility and energy companies. Shortly thereafter, the EC also published its Energy Policy for Europe (EPE), arguing that the creation of a single EU-wide energy policy, as well as an integrated continental gas market, were essential for the attainment of energy security. These documents strengthened the EC’s mandate to enforce Energy Policy Directive 2003/55/EC, published in 2003, which had called for Member States to liberalize their energy markets and unbundled national energy champions.
The EU has increasingly focused on its relationship with Algeria as a result of EU officials’ concerns regarding the security of European gas supplies. These, in turn, rest upon two considerations that have inexorably altered EU energy policy. First, EU-25 countries have become increasingly dependent on imported gas in order to meet their energy needs. While Europe was, until recently, largely able to rely on domestically produced gas to meet many of its energy needs, it has in the last ten years depleted most of its gas fields. Indeed, since 1998, European gas production has stagnated at approximately 11.2 trillion cubic feet.7 Europe’s share of global gas production, which stood at 11.4 percent in 2004, is projected to fall by 0.4 percent annually until 2030.8 Estimates made in early 2007 stated that Europe contains only 179 out of 6,183 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves, a mere 2.9 percent of global reserves.9 Europe, in short, has had to find a solution to deal with the fall in domestic gas production; that solution has inexorably involved leaning more heavily on major gas exporters, including Russia and Algeria.
Europe’s energy consumption, meanwhile, is projected to increase steadily between 2004 and 2030. According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), “[n]atural gas is expected to be the fastest growing fuel source in OECD Europe, with demand increasing at an average rate of 1.4 percent, from 18.8 trillion cubic feet in 2004 to 23.0 trillion cubic feet in 2015 and 26.9 trillion cubic feet in 2030.”10 Put simply, “the discovery of additional gas reserves in OECD countries has not kept pace with the depletion of gas reserves and the increase in gas demand.”11 According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), OECD Europe’s imports will rise from 186 bcm in 2000 to 625 bcm in 2030; the percentage of imports relative to overall consumption will increase from 36 percent to 69 percent over the same 30-year period.12 This increase in gas demand, coinciding as it does with falling domestic production, gives EU leaders cause to fret about Europe’s dependence on foreign gas and the security of its supplies.
Beyond these supply and demand trends, geopolitics have made European leaders fear that countries rich in gas reserves, particularly Russia, will use the ‘gas weapon’ in order to achieve strategic objectives. This has effectively increased the stakes in the EU’s drive to foster stronger ties with Algeria. In January 2006, Russia’s ‘gas wars’ with Ukraine, during which Russia cut gas supplies to the Ukraine for three days, caused great consternation amongst European leaders. Indeed, many concluded from this episode that Russia could not be trusted to deliver sufficient gas to Western European markets. To European policy-makers, Russia’s behavior “seemed to prove that the world’s largest gas producer ha[d] become all but reluctant to enforce its political interests by playing the energy card.”13 Moreover, soon after these ‘gas wars,’ officials in key gas-exporting countries mused about the creation of a gas cartel much as key oil-exporting countries did in 1960, prior to the creation of OPEC. Chakib Khelil, Algeria’s Energy Minister, stated in April 2007 that, “in the long run we are moving towards a gas OPEC.”14 These events convinced European leaders that action had to be taken in order to avert a future gas crisis, part of which included working more closely with Algeria.
The EU’s reaction to Russia’s ‘gas wars’ was, most experts argue, largely irrational. Indeed, contrary to many Europeans’ belief, Russia remains a reliable supplier of gas. The ‘gas wars,’ most experts correctly assert, were more reflective of a pricing dispute between Russia and the Ukraine, one triggered in large part by Ukraine’s theft of pipeline gas being sent across its territory to Western European markets, than of a power play by a newly adventurous Russia. With regards to the possibility of a gas cartel, market analysts likewise convincingly argue that European fears were unfounded, since such a cartel would take a long time to develop, gas can relatively easily be substituted for by alternative energy sources, and, most importantly, the gas markets are inherently local, which means that “there is no global market for a future OGEC to corner.”15 Yet, in spite of the fact that “Russia has less leverage on European customers than assumed”16 and that “fears of a gas OPEC are overblown,”17 European leaders tend to perceive their gas supplies as increasingly vulnerable; in response, they have made energy cooperation with Algeria increasingly important to their foreign policy objectives, as illustrated above.
Many European policy-makers consider Algeria to be an ideal country to help the EU minimize its reliance on Russian gas. To begin with, it holds the world’s eighth largest proven reserves of natural gas (4.6 tcm) and is the world’s fifth largest producer of gas and the world’s fourth largest gas exporter.18 It is the third-largest exporter of gas to the EU, providing Europe with 13 percent of the total amount consumed and 20 percent of the total amount imported. Only two countries—Russia and Norway—provide EU countries with more gas than Algeria does. Moreover, southern Europe, including Spain and Italy, relies heavily on Algerian gas to meet its energy needs. Algerian gas, for example, accounts for 49 percent of all of Italy’s gas imports; in Spain, it accounts for 61 percent of all imported gas.19 In addition, Algerian gas fields lie significantly closer to Europe than do Russia’s, most of which are located east of the Urals. The fact that Algeria’s large gas fields lie close to European markets makes Algeria a more attractive energy partner than countries whose fields lie further afield, as proximity to consumer markets largely determines transportation and investment costs.
Most importantly, the Algerian government, independently of the various EU initiatives outlined above, plans to bolster gas production, as well as the volume of pipeline gas that it exports to Europe. In effect, it hopes to increase revenues in order to invest in both the country’s hydrocarbon and non-hydrocarbon industries. Sonatrach, Algeria’s state-owned oil and gas champion, intends to increase gas exports by 45 percent between 2002 and 2010 in order to boost revenues.20 As the Natural Gas Market Review 2006 posits, “Algeria, currently OPEC’s largest gas exporter, with 64 bcm in 2003, looks set to expand to 76 bcm by 2010.”21 It plans to expand existing pipelines – the Enrico Mattei (TransMed), Pedro Farrell (GME) and Green Stream lines – as well as to build new pipelines, including Medgaz, which would connect Algeria to Almeria on SE coast of Spain, and Galsi, which would connect Algeria to Cagliari, Sardinia. As Jonathan Stern averred, “the importance of North Africa…goes beyond the purely numerical aspect of projected volumes. North Africa is likely to be the only supply source which will increase the volume of pipeline gas dedicated to Europe.”22
Algeria’s Response To EU Initiatives
Despite the fact that Algeria is now boosting gas production, Algeria’s response to the EU initiatives mentioned above has been tepid and, from the EU’s perspective, decidedly disappointing. Though Algeria signed the Barcelona Declaration in 1995 and the related Association Agreement in 2001, it has failed to implement many of the reforms called for in those documents. Its approach to the Barcelona Process has generally involved striking a delicate balance between maintaining autonomy over matters of domestic policy and signaling to the EU a willingness to consider cooperation under the right circumstances. In short, it has tried to position itself as a player in the integrative process who, despite its interest in EU-Mediterranean partnership, places the exigencies of domestic politics above those of foreign relations.
Since the inception of the Barcelona Process, two different presidents have governed Algeria, each of whom pursued a different approach to the question of EU-Mediterranean cooperation. Between 1995 and 1999, President Liamine Zeroual presided over a government struggling to deal with a full-fledged civil war and an impending balance of payments crisis. On the political front, his main objectives were to restore stability, to consolidate his political base and to negotiate a settlement with militant leaders of the Islamist party, the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS). On the economic front, he sought to secure international assistance in order to overcome an increasing debt burden, which grew to 60 percent of GDP in 1993, a sudden stop of capital inflows, rising unemployment and a fall in aggregate demand.23 His need to secure sources of capital led him, amongst other things, to conclude deals with the IMF, the Paris Club and the London Club that allowed Algeria to reschedule its debt and increase its borrowing from international institutions. It was within this context of economic plight and appeals for international assistance that he agreed to sign the Barcelona Declaration. While his efforts led to a slight economic recovery, they failed to usher in a new era of political stability; in early 1999, he announced that he would not run for reelection.
When his successor, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, took office in 1999, Algeria still suffered from underinvestment, high unemployment and crippling debt. President Bouteflika’s program, in contrast to that of his predecessor, focused on encouraging foreign investment through economic liberalization; opening up Algeria’s markets, he hoped, would allow it to solve its economic crisis and lay the foundation for political reconciliation between Algeria’s warring factions. His reform-minded administration sought “a major institutional restructuring to adapt to a free, open and competitive market economy.”24 In line with this move towards freer markets, Algeria ratified the Association Agreement in 2005 in which Algeria resolved to implement the reforms set out in the Barcelona Process. This set the stage for enhanced cooperation with the EU and deliberations to accede to the Energy Charter Treaty; opened the economy to foreign capital; paved the way for banking sector reform, including the privatization of one of the nation’s largest banks and the execution of contracts with European countries worth several billion euros in oil, gas and nuclear energy projects; and, finally, bolstered Algeria’s efforts to attain membership to the WTO.
President Bouteflika also pushed for reforms in the hydrocarbon sector. In 2001, he backed a revised hydrocarbon law. Existing legislation stipulated that Sonatrach hold a 51 percent stake in all commercial oil and gas projects pursued in Algeria. The new law effectively stripped Sonatrach of this mandated majority stake in commercial projects. The revised hydrocarbon law created a new public agency (Alnaft, the Valorizing Agency) to award contracts and manage geological data, functions previously reserved for Sonatrach. It also allowed greater market access to any national or foreign company able to deploy the necessary resources to explore new fields and exploit the resources that they found, and, in the event of a commercial discovery, it stipulated that Sonatrach would be offered the option to be only a minority partner, holding up to 25 percent ownership, which contrasted markedly with the existing stipulation of majority share ownership.
Though these reform efforts seem to suggest that the Algerian government has been happy to cooperate with the EU, two conspicuous facts emerge from the historical record that complicate the story. First, Algeria has pursued negotiations with the EU only during times of economic tribulation; myopic self-interest rather than a genuine commitment to the idea of an EU-Mediterranean union has driven its participation in EU-Mediterranean talks. In 1995, for example, Algeria signed the Barcelona Declaration in order to help stop the capital outflows triggered by the ongoing civil war. It was only because President Zeroual realized that his government needed external support to emerge from the impending balance of payments crisis that he decided to sign the Declaration.25 Similarly, President Bouteflika signed the Association Agreement and reformed the hydrocarbon law in 2001 in order to garner support for Algeria’s bid to enter the WTO, a move that he considered essential for Algeria’s economic and political health. Writing in 2001, Meredeth Turshen noted that, “Algeria’s recent behavior – Bouteflika’s trip to Washington, liberalization of the economy and increasing ties to [multinational corporations] – can be understood in the context of the government’s decision to apply for admission to the WTO…as in the past, Algeria wants to control its interaction with the outside world.”26
More importantly, domestic opposition has undermined the implementation of each of the aforementioned reforms. The 2001 hydrocarbon law, for instance, was overturned in 2004 following a protracted conflict between Sonatrach and the government concerning the distribution of rents from gas sales. By 2004, Sonatrach had effectively reestablished its mandated majority stake in all commercial gas and oil projects. Similarly, vested interest groups derailed government plans to privatize one of the nation’s largest banks, Credit Populaire d’Algerie. This privatization, which had been in the works since 2005, was scrapped on the eve of the deadline for the submission of bids (November 25, 2007). Bowing to pressure from domestic business elites, the Algerian government unceremoniously announced that the privatization process had been abandoned.
Prospects for Future EU-Algerian Cooperation
The fact that Algeria has cooperated with the EU only in order to bolster its economic performance suggests that, once Algeria no longer requires EU economic and technical assistance, it will cease to pursue EU-backed reforms. The conditions for this relative independence have, in fact, largely come to pass. Algeria’s economy has experienced a period of sustained growth during the last six years in an era of high oil and gas prices. Between 2002 and 2007, Algeria has enjoyed low inflation, steadily declining unemployment, and an average GDP growth rate of nearly 7 percent.27 Meanwhile, the strong expansion of hydrocarbon receipts has allowed a large increase in public investment and wages in the non-hydrocarbon sector. Algeria has prepaid much of its external debt and has maintained tight monetary and fiscal policies, leading the IMF to project strong growth over the next five years.
In addition, President Bouteflika has promoted economic diversification in order to insulate the economy from the volatility of the oil and gas prices. He has capitalized on Algeria’s current account surpluses and concomitant increases in its international reserves to invest in agriculture, infrastructure, manufacturing and construction, all labor-intensive industries. This has led to a steady reduction in Algeria’s unemployment rate, which currently stands at 15 percent. More importantly, the government’s fiscal stimulus plan for 2005-2009 significantly bolstered investment in the non-hydrocarbon sectors, which grew at 5 percent annually between 2002 and 2006.
While good for Algeria’s long-run economic outlook, the President’s drive to diversify Algeria’s economy and to establish links with partners outside of Europe threatens to undermine whatever limited power of persuasion the EU has had in the past. As argued above, both President Bouteflika and his predecessor, President Zeroual, have looked to Europe for economic aid and technical assistance, as well as for export markets, in order to help avert domestic crises. As Algeria’s economy matures and its political sector stabilizes, the need for European aid will diminish. Moreover, the less dependent Algeria’s economy is on revenues from gas exports to Europe, the more independence Algerian leaders can afford in their dealings with the EU. Whereas President Bouteflika previously felt constrained by the need to pursue economic growth and viewed closer cooperation with Europe as a necessary step towards economic stability, he has recently begun to pursue bilateral and multilateral ties with Algeria’s neighbors. This development merely underlines President Bouteflika’s decreasing dependency on Europe as an engine for Algeria’s economic recovery.
In an era in which Algeria relies less on gas exports to Europe and is actively pursuing economic, political and military ties with Russia, India and the United States, the EU’s hopes to reform Algeria seem increasingly fantastic. As argued above, the Barcelona Process has largely failed, undermining one of the EU’s most potentially powerful bargaining tools; trade barriers, meanwhile, have already been reduced significantly such that the promise of further reductions has relatively little effect on EU-Algerian relations. Most importantly, the EU is becoming increasingly dependent on Algerian gas, which gives Algeria greater leverage over Europe. Recent statements by European leaders regarding their desire to import more—rather than less—Algerian gas in order to diversify its gas imports undermine the EU’s ability to pressure Algeria to accept EU-backed reforms.
Given the embedded conflicts between Algeria’s most powerful institutions and Algeria’s increasing economic independence and diversification, politically unpopular reforms, including many of those backed by the EU, face particular difficulties in getting pushed through the legislature. Indeed, the forces of change are often too weak and the incentives for reform too small to overcome the opposition from those who have vested interests in maintaining the status quo. Moreover, when changes are incorporated into law, they are often quickly overturned. As noted above, even President Bouteflika’s reform initiatives, which helped Algeria to achieve macroeconomic stability, have largely been undone in the last two years.
Rethinking EU Policy vis-à-vis Algeria
In light of the changing economic condition in Algeria, the EU ought to reconsider its foreign policy objectives vis-à-vis Algeria. While a full set of policy recommendations is beyond the scope of this paper, I offer here two primary critiques of the EU’s policy approach from which policy suggestions can be inferred. First, the EU has consistently failed to take into consideration the power that interest groups play in Algeria. As argued above, actors with vested interests have consistently undermined the government’s ability to implement reform projects. The fate of both the 2001 hydrocarbon reforms, which represented the greatest liberalization initiative in Algeria’s gas and oil industry since 1995, and the more recent effort to privatize one of the nation’s largest state-run banks ought to serve as a warning to EU policymakers: democratization and liberalization will be ineffective so long as the interests of domestic actors are not taken into account. Rather than negotiate exclusively with members of President Bouteflika’s administration, therefore, EU officials ought to work more closely with Sonatrach and the army, as well as opposition groups within civil society, in order to establish a coalition of domestic actors who can help push through a given set of reforms. The EU is likely to achieve its long-term goals in Algeria only if it brings anti-reform players to the negotiating table. This, in turn, requires that the EU devise a new, more inclusive implementation strategy.
Beyond this, the EU has adopted a policy approach based largely on normative—rather than functional—considerations. As mentioned above, the Barcelona Declaration and, to a lesser extent, the European Neighborhood Policy, included policy goals that, while normatively sound, were functionally suspect. Through its policy initiatives, the EU has extolled the virtues of reforms based on democratic and liberal economic policies, yet has failed to show how these reforms could foster long-term cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean Partners. Rather than continuing to pursue reforms that reflect the EU’s ideological penchant, the EU ought to pursue those that are likely to succeed. In Algeria, this entails reassessing the merits of calling for reforms that have little support from power groups within Algeria. For example, given the government’s and army’s aversion to allowing Islamist parties to run in national elections, the EU should not make full democratization a pillar upon which future EU-Algeria cooperation rests. If it continues to pursue reforms based on normative considerations, its initiatives are likely to do little more than exacerbate the current gap between European demands and Algerian preferences.
While this poses little threat to EU-Algeria energy relations in the short run, it may have deleterious effects on the security of gas supplies to Europe in the long run. Indeed, the more Europe calls for unpopular reforms in Algeria, the more likely Algerian leaders will be to invest some of the country’s growing international reserves into liquefied natural gas projects in order to ship its gas to non-European customers. At a time when “the global gas trade is shifting to more LNG trade allowing more flexibility for exporters,”28 this could only hurt Europe’s efforts to diversify away from Russian gas.
Therefore, the EU ought to make security of gas supplies its primary objective in Algeria and tone down its calls for democratization and liberalization until the domestic context is more amenable to these reforms. In doing so, it will not only increase the likelihood that Algeria continues to export its gas to Europe but will also help the EU foster a constructive relationship with Algeria, laying the foundation upon which further reform could be pursued.
- M. Emerson and G. Noutcheva, “From Barcelona Process to Neighbourhood Policy.” Centre for European Policy Studies Working Document N. 220. March 2005, p. 4.
- Mustafa Nabli, “After Argentina: Was MENA right to be Cautious?” Speech. Office of the Senior Vice President, World Bank. March 20, 2002. Florence, Italy, p. 1.
- Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for 2007 lists Algeria as the 99th most corrupt country in the world (down from 88th in 2003). Other North African countries fare similarly poorly: Tunisia is ranked 61st; Morocco, 72nd; Egypt, 105th; and Libya, 131st. Transparency International. “The 2007 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index.” Transparency International Online 2007, Accessed electronically on February 13, 2008 at http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2007.
- European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper. Brussels: May 12, 2004.
- European Commission, European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument, Algeria Strategy Paper 2007-2013. National Indicative Programme 2007-2010: Brussels, p. 23.
- European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Council and the European Parliament. Energy Policy for Europe: Brussels, January 10, 2007, p. 4.
- Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook 2007. EIA: Washington, D.C., 2007, p. 1.
- Energy Information Administration, “Dry Natural Gas Production, Most Recent Annual Estimates,” International Energy Annual 2005, p. 43. Last updated September 7, 2007. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/RecentNaturalGasProductionTCF.xls.
- Oil & Gas Journal, “Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production,” Oil & Gas Journal, Vol. 104, No. 47 (December 18, 2006), p. 22-23.
- Energy Information Administration, International Energy Outlook 2007, p. 45.
- International Energy Agency, Security of Gas in Open Markets: LNG and Power at a Turning Point. OECD/IEA: Paris, 2004, p. 3.
- International Energy Agency, Security of Gas in Open Markets: LNG and Power at a Turning Point. OECD/IEA: Paris, 2004, p. 123.
- Goldthau, A., Rhetoric versus reality: Russian threats to European energy supply. Energy Policy (2007), doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2007.10.012.
- Andrew Mernin, “Cartel Countdown?” ArabianBusiness.com. April 15, 2007, http://www.arabianbusiness.com/11044-cartel-countdown, p. 1.
- The Economist, “A Gas OPEC.” The Economist. February 5, 2007, p. 1.
- Goldthau, p. 4.
- The Economist, p. 1.
- International Energy Agency, Natural Gas Market Review 2006. OECD/IEA: Paris, 2006, p. 117.
- European Commission, EU Energy Policy Data 2006, Commission Staff Working Document: Brussels, October 10, 2007.
- International Energy Agency, Security of Gas in Open Markets: LNG and Power at a Turning Point. OECD/IEA: Paris, 2004, p. 360.
- International Energy Agency, Natural Gas Market Review 2006. OECD/IEA: Paris, 2006, p. 15.
- Jonathan Stern, “The New Security Environment for European Gas: Worsening Geopolitics and Increasing Global Competition for LNG,” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, NG 16, October 2006, p. 15.
- Ali Aissaoui, Algeria: the Political Economy of Oil and Gas. Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2001, p. 235-236.
- Aissaoui, p. 114.
- International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 2007. IMF: Washington, D.C., October 2007.
- Meredeth Turshen, “Algerian Oil and Gas,” Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 91, (2002) p. 184-186.
- International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 2007.
- International Energy Agency, Security of Gas in Open Markets: LNG and Power at a Turning Point. OECD/IEA: Paris, 2004, p. 33.