Decapitation: a Long-Term Counterterrorism Strategy?

By Matthew Melino

On 1 November 2013, a US drone strike in North Waziristan killed Hakimullah Mehsud, the leader of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TPP), also known as the Pakistani Taliban.  His death is one of a growing number of high-profile senior Islamic militants, including Osama bin Laden, Anwar al-Awlaki, Abu Ayyub al Masri, and Abu Yahya al-Libi, who have fallen victim to the US counterterrorism strategy of leadership-targeting or decapitation.

Decapitation became a defining characteristic of US counterterrorism policy in 2003 following the release of the Bush administration’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT). The rationale behind the strategy is simple – terrorist leadership provides overall direction and strategy for the group, linking grievances and ultimately becoming the catalyst for terrorist action. Therefore, eliminating the leader should result in the group’s collapse. Counterterrorism strategies have since relied on this assumption and have succeeded in removing influential figures. However al-Qaeda and TPP continue to promote their extremist ideology, and their adaptability in the aftermath of targeted killings leads many to question whether decapitation is truly an effective long-term strategy. 

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Is Chinese Communist Rule More Effective than Western-Style Democracy?

By Richard Upchurch

An interesting TED Talk has recently been circulating the web and provoking strong reactions. In the video, Chinese investor and political scientist Eric Li argues that Chinese communism is both sui generis and equally as valid a political system as, or perhaps better than, Western-style democracy. He contends that the success of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is proof that democracy is not the inevitable apogee of political development that most Western theorists would have us believe. Initially his argument seems compelling and substantive, but ultimately it is specious and beside the point. In the final analysis, he is right about everything but the conclusion.

Here is the video:

Li provides three pieces of evidence to support his claim that the Chinese one-party system is equally effective and valid when compared with Western-style democracy. First, he claims that the CCP is adaptable, as opposed to operationally rigid. He cites the wide spectrum of political reforms enacted since 1950 as evidence of the party’s ability to readjust to differing political and historical exigencies. Here he is right, although arguably the party’s pragmatism did not become evident until the “reform and opening up” period began in the early 1980s. From Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 decision to initiate market reforms to the decision to join the WTO in 2001, it is evident that the Chinese government is willing to fudge ideology if it means more money and prestige for the country and greater legitimacy for the party. Such a result is not surprising after the country was ravaged internally by the CCP’s own misguided policies of the pre-reform era, namely the Great Leap Forward. The party has learned a lesson; that in and of itself demonstrates adaptability.

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On the Issue of Immunity for Heads of State at the ICC

 By Sirtaj Kaur

The imminent trial of Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta in the International Criminal Court (ICC) has raised a storm, with all the African Union nations rallying to get the February 2014 trial delayed because of Kenyatta’s current position as head of state. The AU countries argue that such trials undermine peace and security, and are trying to push for an amendment to Article 27 of the Rome Statute to provide immunity to incumbent heads of state. But such an amendment might not be in consonance with the tenets of international law.

Although the outcome of this debate at the ICC remains to be seen, it is pertinent to consider the immunity question in the context of the Kenyatta case. Three things are essential to note – (1) that Kenya is a State Party to the Rome Statute governing the ICC, (2) that Article 27[i] of the Rome Statute repudiates the diplomatic immunity generally held by heads of state under international law, and (3) that the post-election violence of 2007 in Kenya was investigated by the Commission of Enquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), which was answerable to the African Union Panel of Eminent African Personalities. The CIPEV recommended that a special tribunal be established to prosecute the crimes, failing which, consideration was to be given by the AU Panel to forward the names of the alleged perpetrators to the ICC. After several failed attempts at establishing such a tribunal, the names were in fact forwarded to the ICC.

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Introducing the 2014 Edition of the BCJIA: "Stalemates"

By Jeffrey S. Wright

Welcome to the 2014 incarnation of the Bologna Center Journal of International Affairs. As Editor in Chief, I have the pleasure of leading an extremely talented staff in producing this year’s print journal and website. We look forward to contributing to the rich intellectual conversation already taking place at SAIS Europe.

The theme of this year’s journal will be “Stalemates”. Though the term originally comes from chess, where it refers to a situation in which no move is available, we are interested in examining stalemates in international affairs. These are the defining issues of global affairs today - problems which have become deadlocked and require innovative solutions to untangle. Examples fill the front page of every newspaper. How can the international community stop the bloodshed in Syria? How can the world’s powers come together to address global climate change? How can the EU address its structural flaws and fulfill its mission to unite Europe? In both the print edition and on the web, we want to explore why these conflicts are in deadlock, and suggest innovative solutions that carry the potential to turn stalemates into breakthroughs.

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The Myth of "Africanistan"

By: Evan Fowler

On April 6, 2012, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MLNA) proclaimed “irrevocably the independent state of Azawad” in northern Mali, a territory that comprised about two-thirds of the Malian state.¹ The declaration of independence underscored a commitment to existing international borders, an adherence to the United Nations Charter and a dedication to fostering lasting peace within a democratic, constitutional Azawad.² Azawadi independence was the culmination of the 2012 Tuareg rebellion, in which the Tuareg revolted against Bamako and Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré was ousted for his counter-insurgency strategy.

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